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II KISDM MONALSIATEMENT 
This court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (2001). The Utah 
Supreme Court granted Plaintiffs' Petition for Permission to Appeal the district court's 
interlocutory order and transferred the case to this court. (Order dated August 23, 2002; see also 
Letter from Court of Appeals R. 197.) 
STATEMENT < H I ill I SSI E 
Before the court is whether the district court correctly held that state legislation prohibits 
bicyclists from riding against traffic and that any municipal ordinance that purports to permit 
otherwise is in conflict with the state legislation and therefore invalid. 
The district court's ruling on the parties7 motions for partial summary judgment is 
reviewed for correctness. See, e.g., Gottling v. P.R. Inc., 2002 UT 95, ffl[ 4-5, _ P.3d _ . 
(indicating that a district court's ruling on motions for partial summary judgment is reviewed for 
correctness). 
The issue was preserved for appeal by virtue of the district court ruling on the cross-
motions for partial summary judgment. (Minute Entry (R. 162-166).) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case involves the interpretation of state legislation and its relation to a conflicting 
municipal ordinance. The district court held that state statutory law requires bicyclists to ride 
with, not against traffic, and that any city ordinance to the contrary purporting to permit 
bicyclists in a bicycle lane to ride against traffic is invalid. The Nature Conservancy submits that 
the district court's decision should be affirmed. 
The facts are undisputed. Plaintiff Tyler Hansen ("Hansen") and Defendant Amanda 
1 
Eyre ("Eyre") were involved in an automobile/bicycle accident at the intersection of 200 South 
and 500 East in Salt Lake City on February 17, 2000. Eyre, an employee of The Nature 
Conservancy ("Nature Conservancy"), was traveling southbound on 500 East in her car. She 
stopped at a red light. Hansen, a bicycle messenger, was riding his bicycle east on 200 South. 
Hansen was riding his bicycle in a bicycle lane, but against the flow of traffic, and in the bicycle 
lane on the left-hand side of the street instead of the bicycle lane on the right-hand side of the 
street. Hansen had initially proceeded eastbound in the bicycle lane on the right-hand side of the 
street, and with the flow of traffic. However, before colliding with Eyre. Hansen had crossed the 
street in the middle of the block west of the intersection. Hansen then continued eastbound 
against traffic, in the north-side bicycle lane until he arrived at the intersection where he and Eyre 
collided. Eyre, after stopping at the red light, was beginning her right-hand turn, westbound, 
when she collided with Hansen who was in the bicycle lane but traveling against traffic. 
Plaintiffs filed suit claiming Eyre was negligent because she violated sections of the Utah 
Code and various Salt Lake City Ordinances in colliding with Hansen. (Compl. (R. 1-4); 
Amended Compl. and Request for Jury (R. 5-7); Second Am. Compl. (R. 18-21).) Plaintiffs 
subsequently filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. (Mot. Partial Summ. J. (R. 45).) 
This motion was denied, with the court granting Eyre a continuance to conduct discovery 
pursuant to Rule 56(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. (Notice of Decision (R. 72).) 
Following the court's decision, Plaintiffs filed their Third Amended Complaint. Plaintiffs 
alleged the same legal theory against Eyre, but they added Nature Conservancy as a defendant, 
claiming Eyre was acting in the course of her employment when she and Hansen collided. 
(Third Am. Compl. (R. 81-84).) 
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Defendant Nature Conservancy filed a motion for partial summary'judgment. (Cross-Mot. 
for Partial Summ. J. (R. 107-08).) At the same time, Nature Conservancy also opposed 
Plaintiffs motion for partial summary judgment.1 (Mem. in Opp'n to Pis/ Mot. for Partial 
Summ. J. and In Support of Cross-Mot. for Partial Summ. J. (R. 109-126).) Nature Conservancy 
asked the court to "hold as a matter of law that plaintiff violated Utah Code Annotated §§41-6-
87 & 41-6-87.5 by riding his bicycle on the left-hand side of the highway, against the designated 
flow of traffic." (Cross-Mot. for Partial Summ. J. (R. 107).) Nature Conservancy also argued 
that irrespective of the Salt Lake City Ordinance, the Utah Code prohibits bicyclists from riding 
in a left-hand bicycle lane against traffic. (Mem. in Opp'n to Pis/ Mot. for Partial Summ. J. and 
In Support of Cross-Mot. for Partial Summ. J. (R. 109-126).) Consequently, Nature 
Conservancy argued, the Salt Lake City Ordinance conflicts with state law, and is therefore 
invalid. (Id.) Plaintiffs opposed the motion, and at the same time, renewed their motion for 
partial summary judgment. (Renewed Mot. Partial Summ. J. (R. 139-40).) Plaintiffs argued that 
under Salt Lake City Ordinance 12.80.070(1), Hansen was entitled to ride his bicycle against the 
flow of traffic because he was in a designated bicycle lane. (Response to Cross Mot. of Def, 
The Nature Conservancy, for Partial Summ. J. and Mem. in Support of Renewed Mot. for Partial 
Summ. J. (R. 132-138)). Plaintiffs further professed that the ordinance did not conflict with state 
legislation. (Id.) 
The district court denied both Plaintiffs' and Defendants' motions for partial summary 
1
 Defendant Eyre joined The Nature Conservancy's Cross-Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment and its Memorandum in Support of Cross Motion for Summary Judgment. (Joinder in 
the Cross-Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (R. 127-28)). 
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judgment. (Minute Entry (R. 162-166).) In denying Plaintiffs' motion, the district court 
determined that state statutory law requires bicyclists to ride with traffic, and that any city 
ordinance that purports to allow otherwise violates the state Motor Vehicle Code. (Id. at 164.) 
The district court rejected Plaintiffs' contention that the city ordinance is an exception to the state 
statute. Instead, the district court explained that local ordinances may regulate matters already 
covered by state law. but only if "the ordinance in no way conflicts with existing state law;' (Id. 
at 164 (quotation without citation in original)); see Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-16 (1998 
Replacement Vol.); Walker v. Union Pac. R.R., 844 P.2d 335, 339 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). The 
district court then went on to hold that "state law was and is . . . clear that bicycles are to ride in 
the direction of motor vehicle traffic," and that "[a]n ordinance that purports to allow otherwise 
is in conflict with such state law." (Id at 164.) The district court further stated, "more 
importantly, it is directly against the Utah statute to travel by bicycle against the flow of vehicle 
traffic." (Id. at 164.) In so holding, the court denied Plaintiffs' motion for partial summary 
judgment. 
Plaintiffs petitioned the supreme court for permission to appeal this interlocutory order. 
(Pet. for Permission to Appeal (R. 175-192.) The supreme court granted Plaintiffs' petition and 
subsequently transferred the case to this court pursuant to Utah Code section 78-2-2(4). (Order 
dated August 23, 2002; see also Letter from Court of Appeals R. 197.) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The district court correctly denied Plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment. 
State legislation, particularly Utah Code section 41-6-87, requires bicyclists to ride with, not 
against, traffic even when the bicyclist is in a marked bicycle lane. Salt Lake City Ordinance 
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12.80.070(1) purports to allow bicyclists to ride against traffic when in a marked bicycle lane. 
Because the ordinance conflicts with the state legislation, the ordinance is invalid. Accordingly, 
the district court correctly determined that state legislation prohibited bicycling against the flow 
of traffic and that any ordinance purporting to allow otherwise, Salt Lake City Ordinance 
12.80.070 here, is in conflict with state law. As a result, the decision of the district court should 
be affirmed. 
ARGUMENT 
I. The District Court Correctly Held that the Utah Code Requires Bicyclists to Ride with 
Traffic; Because the Salt Lake City Ordinance Purports to Allow Otherwise, it is in 
Conflict with State Law and therefore Invalid 
The state statutory provisions governing the operation of bicycles on roadways prohibit 
riding against traffic. The Salt Lake City Ordinance purporting to permit a bicyclist to ride 
against traffic in a marked bicycle lane conflicts with this statutory rule. Accordingly, pursuant 
to state law, the Salt Lake City Ordinance is invalid. As a result, the trial court's decision 
denying the Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment was correct and should be affirmed. 
Plaintiffs point out that the state legislature authorized municipalities to enact ordinances 
that regulate the operation of bicycles. Plaintiffs noticeably fail to point out, however, that such 
authority exists only to the extent that the ordinances do not conflict with state legislation. 
Ordinances that conflict with state statutes are invalid. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 41-6-16 & -17 
(1998 Replacement Vol.). 
Section 41-6-17 reads, in relevant part: 
(1) The provisions of this chapter do not prevent local authorities, with respect to 
highways under their jurisdiction and within the reasonable exercise of police power, 
from: 
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(h) regulating the operation of bicycles 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-17 (1998 Replacement Vol.) (amended 2001).2 However, section 41-6-
16 reads: 
The provisions of this chapter are applicable and uniform throughout this state 
and in all of its political subdivisions and municipalities. A local authority may 
not enact or enforce any rule or ordinance in conflict with the provisions of this 
chapter. Local authorities may, however, adopt ordinances consistent with this 
chapter, and additional traffic ordinances which are not in conflict with this 
chapter. 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-16 (1998 Replacement Vol.) (amended 2001) (emphasis added).' Thus, 
while the state legislature gave Salt Lake City authority to promulgate ordinances regulating the 
operation of bicycles, the legislature simultaneously prohibited any Salt Lake City ordinances 
that conflict with state statutes. Municipal ordinances that conflict in any way with state statutes 
are invalid. See Walker v. Union Pac. R.R., 844 P.2d 335, 339 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) ("Utah 
permits local governments to legislate by ordinance those subjects already covered by state 
legislation, provided (1) the state has not foreclosed municipal legislation of the subject, and (2) 
'the ordinance in no way conflicts with existing state law.'" (quoting Redwood Gym v. Salt Lake 
City ComnTn, 624 P.2d 1138, 1144 (Utah 1981)); Salt Lake City v. Kusse, 97 Utah 97, 102; 85 
P.2d 802, 804 (1938) (explaining the principle that a municipal ordinance dealing with the same 
1
 Nature Conservancy cites the statutes in effect at the time of the accident and notes their 
subsequent amendments parenthetically. 
3
 This statute repudiates Plaintiffs' suggestion that "no Utah authority [exists] dealing 
specifically with the issue of whether such an ordinance is within the power delegated to cities to 
regulate bicycle traffic," (Brief of Appellant at 17), and it contradicts Plaintiffs' claim that "there 
is no justifiable basis for arguing that Salt Lake City has exceeded the authority to regulate the 
operation of bicycles in the City granted by Section 41-6-17(l)(h)." (Brief of Appellant at 19.) 
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subject matter as a state statute is by or inconsistent with the statute), affd 
onielLg, 97 Utah 113, 93 P.2d 671 (1938). 
The question, therefore, is whether Salt Lake City Ordinance 12.80.<H> i ^ no iilid IHO an t 
it conflicts in any way with sectic !he Utah Code. In determining whether an 
ordinance is in 'conflict' with general laws, the test is whether the ordinance permits or licenses 
that which the statute forbids and prohibits, and vice versa." Kusse, 97 I i;ih H <H K"S P 'd .n 
804 (citatioi i omitted), affdonreh a. *>'-' i 'i
 5h. 113, 93 P.2d 671 (1938); see also Walker, 844 
P.2d at 340 (holding that an ordinance which purported to prohibit an activity pemiitted by the 
statute conflicted with the statute and was therefore pi e c =; i P . . • o • - o< | n o»•• • rdinance 
permits that w Inch 1 he statute prohibits, the ordinance conflicts with the statute and is invalid. 
See Walker, 844 P.2d at 340; Kusse, 97 Utah at 102, 85 P.2d at 804. Nature Conservancy 
submits that the ordinance is invalid because it conflicts wiili section 11 -o-S"7 ihe ordinance 
purports to permit what the statute prohibits-bicycling against the flow of traffic. 
The statutory provisions, when read together and in light of the statute's intent to pi oiilote 
bicycle safety, clearly prohibit bicyclists from riding agair - \,yw even when bicycle lanes are 
present. The version of Utah Code section 41-6-87 in effect at the time of the accident read, in 
relevant part, as follows: 
(1) a person operating a bicycle or a moped upon a roadway at less than the 
normal speed of traffic at the time and place and under the conditions then 
existing shall ride as near as practicable to the right-hand edge of the roadway 
except when: 
(a) overtaking and passing anome: MC •. - • M*« • - proceeding in the 
same direction; 
(b) preparing to make a left hand turn at an intersection or into a private 
road or driveway; or 
(c) reasonably necessary to avoid conditions including, but not limited to, 
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fixed or moving objects, parked or moving vehicles, bicycles, pedestrians, 
animals, surface hazards, or substandard width lanes that make it unsafe to 
continue along the right-hand edge. . . . 
(3) If a useable path for bicycles has been provided adjacent to a roadway, bicycle 
riders shall use the path and not the roadway. 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-87 (1998 Replacement Vol.) (amended 2001). For the reasons which 
follow, based upon the language of the statute and the legislative intent and purpose of 
promoting bicycle safety, this statute requires bicyclists to ride with traffic, even when a bicycle 
lane exists. 
The primary rule of statutory interpretation is to give effect to the intent of the legislature 
in light of the purpose the statute was meant to achieve. To discover that intent, one looks first to 
the plain language of the statute. In construing the language of the statute, one must also assume 
that each statutory term was used advisedly; thus the statutory words are read literally, unless 
such a reading is unreasonably confused or inoperable. Harmon City. Inc. v. Nielsen & Senior, 
907 P.2d 1162, 1167 (Utah 1995).- If a provision causes doubt or uncertainty in its application, 
the act is then analyzed in its entirety, and the provisions of the act are harmonized in accordance 
with the legislative intent and purpose. Osuala v. Aetna Life & Cas., 608 P.2d 242, 243 (Utah 
1980)). The intent of the legislature in enacting laws that regulate the operation of bicycles, 
particularly section 41-6-87, is public safety. See Greaves v. State. 528 P.2d 805, 807 (Utah 
1974) (noting that the purpose of the Utah Motor Vehicle Code is to govern safety of the use and 
operation of motor vehicles); Martin v. Stevens, 121 Utah 484, 491, 243 P.2d 747, 750 (1952) 
(noting that the purpose of traffic regulation is to facilitate efficient use of the streets consistent 
with safety and that safety is the first and most important consideration): Dixon v. Bergin, 64 
' ' -8, 
Utah 195, 204-05, 228 P.2d 744, 748 (1.924) (n. lei iti< )nii ig tl uit traffic i :gulatioi is have been 
adopted for the convenience and safety of all who may use the streets).4 When analyzed in their 
entirety and harmonized in accordance with the legislative intent and purpose, the provisions of 
section 41-6-87 prohibit bicycling against traffic, even in a marked bicycle lane. 
I lie language of the statutory provisions reflects the legislative intent to provide for the 
safety of all those who use public roads, including bicyclists. The general rule enacted by the 
state legisiatureprovid.es that bicycles must be ridden "as near as praciinible i<> (lie n^hl-hand 
edge of the roadway." Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-87(1) (1998 Replacement Vol.) (amended 2001). 
This rule contributes to the safety of the bicyclists by creating two requirements. First, bicyclists 
must ride near the edge of tl le i oadway, oi itside of the flow ot automobile traffic. Second, 
bicyclists must ride on the right-hand side of the street; the language "right-hand edge" requires 
bicyclists ride with the flow of traffic, not against it, ()h :oi. u . \\\c .egislature's intent in 
passing this legislation was to promote bicycle safety. '. 
In enacting this general rule that bicyclists must ride on the right-hand edge of the street, 
the state legislature also outlined three exceptions. The exceptioi is prnnil a birvelisl lo ride 
away from the edge of the road i mder certain circumstances. The exceptions do not, however, 
exempt a rider from riding with traffic on the right-hand side of the road. The exceptions explain 
that the bicyclist need not ride as close as possum . • . - • ' : . •"* '.ung 
and passing another bicycle or vehicle proceeding in the same direction; (b) preparing to make a 
4
 Section 41-6-87 is part of article 11 (Bicycles, Regulation of Operation), which is part 
of chapter 6 (Traffic Rules and Regulations) of Title 41 of the Utah Code, the Utah Motor 
Vehicle Act. 
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left hand turn at an intersection or into a private road or driveway; or (c) reasonably necessary to 
avoid conditions including, but not limited to, fixed or moving objects, parked or moving 
vehicles, bicycles, pedestrians, animals, surface hazards, or substandard width lanes that make it 
unsafe to continue along the right-hand edge." Id. at § 41-6-87(1). While these exceptions 
permit a bicyclist to move away from the right-hand edge, they do not permit a bicyclist to ride 
against traffic. 
The first exception permits a bicyclist to stray away from the edge of the road to pass 
another vehicle. It does not suggest, however, that the bicyclist is no longer required to remain 
on the right-hand side of the road. The second exception permits a bicyclist to move away from 
the edge of the road to make a left-hand turn. The bicyclist must still comply with traffic 
regulations, however. This exception does not suggest that a bicyclist can leave the right-hand 
side of the roadway, cross over into oncoming traffic, and then ride against that traffic before 
making a left-hand turn. The exception permits, for example, a bicyclist to move from the right-
hand edge of the road into a left-hand turn lane when such a lane is available, and then turn left 
as other vehicles do. The exception does not, however, permit a bicyclist to cross the street mid-
block and ride against oncoming traffic before turning left onto an intersecting street. The third 
exception permits a bicyclist to drift from the edge of the roadway when necessary in order to 
avoid hazards. The exception does not permit a bicyclist to ride against traffic on the left-hand 
side of the road, however. The bicyclist should avoid hazards and then resume riding as near as 
practicable to the right-hand edge of the roadway. The language of these exceptions, particularly 
exception (c), clearly reflects the statute's purpose of promoting bicycle safety. 
In sum, the statutory exceptions in subsection (1) do not suggest that the requirement to 
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ride with traffic may be suspended or excepted. The three exceptions permit a bicyclist to move 
away from the edge of the road under particular circumstances. However, the exceptions still do 
not permit a bicyclist to ride against traffic, i-.ven when following an exception, a bicyclist must 
still ndc on the right-hand side of the roadway, with the flow of traffic. Any exception to this 
requirement to ride with traffic would be contrary to the statutory intent and purpose. 
I :inally. the state legislature JIM-,iix" i .•. i. • .1^ \ 
provided adjacent to a roadway, bicycle riders shall use the path and not the roadway.11 Id. at § 
41-6-87(3). As noted previously, this provision must also be read in harmony with the other 
provisions and in iign , . ^ -..•' •; • :Ie safety. • Interpreting ; the i i lie 
in this light means that when a bicycle lane exists, riders are not required to ride their bicycles as 
near as practicable to the right-hand side of the road but instead should ride within the bicycle 
lane, in other words, where t ic exists, 1"tu> iviini- :rent that one ride as near to the 
edge of the roadway is suspended. The requirement that riders must ride with the flow of traffic 
on the right-hand side of the road is not suspended or excepted, however. 
To interpret any statutory or municipal rule to permit riding against traffic, even in a 
bicycle lane, would endanger bicyclists and run contrary to the purpose of state legislation 
regarding bicycle regulation. Permitting bicyclists to i ide against traffi : woi lid increase the risk 
of head on collisions with automobiles. Plus, in circumstances where only one bicycle lane 
exists on a roadway, an exception permitting bicyclists to ride in both directions would risk head-
on bicycle collisions. Moreover, the exact scei lai 10 of tl lis case demonstrates why sue I i a 
proposed exception is contrary to the statutory language, intent, and purpose. If bicyclists are 
permitted to travel in a left-hand bicycle lane against the flow of traffic, a danger exists when 
11 
automobile drivers are turning right onto a street with a bicycle path. The automobile driver who 
is turning right, after looking left for oncoming automobile traffic, would travel through the 
bicycle lane, contrary to oncoming bicycle traffic, to reach the nearest automobile lane. Head on 
collisions such as this accident are an obvious risk. 
As a result, the statute requires bicyclists to ride with traffic, even when a bicycle lane 
exists. When a bicycle lane exists, the requirement to ride near the edge of the road is suspended. 
However, the requirement to ride with traffic is not suspended. Bicyclists must still ride on the 
right-hand side of the road, with the flow of traffic. Thus, where two bicycle lanes exist on a 
roadway-one on each side of the street as is undisputed here—the statute should clearly be 
interpreted to require bicyclists to ride with traffic in their respective right-hand bicycle lanes. 
To interpret the statute to allow riding against traffic in the left-hand bicycle lane would be 
contrary to the safety-oriented purpose of the statute, and a municipal ordinance purporting to 
permit such an exception would conflict with the state legislation. 
The Salt Lake City ordinance in question purports to permit that which the statute 
prohibits-riding against traffic. Accordingly, the ordinance and statute conflict, and the 
ordinance is therefore invalid. Salt Lake City Ordinance 12.80.070 reads, in pertinent part: 
ft is unlawful for operators of bicycles: 
(H) When riding upon a roadway marked with a bicycle lane to ride upon the 
sidewalk or any portion of the roadway outside the marked bicycle lane except 
when making a left turn; 
(I) To ride upon the left-hand side of any street, except when they are within a 
marked bicycle lane or when riding upon a one-way street. 
Ordinance 12.80.070 ostensibly permits a bicyclist in the marked bicycle lane to ride against 
traffic under certain circumstances. Subsection (I) directs that a bicyclist may ride upon the left-
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hand side of the street, against traffic as long as he or she is within a i narked bicycle lane.5 
However , permit t ing as much directly conflicts wi th Utah Code section 41-6-87. For the reasons 
outl ined previously, section 41-6-87 does not permit a bicyclist to ride against traffic, even in a 
bicycle lane. 
Subsect ion (1) of the statute lists three except ions to the general rule that bicyclists "shal l 
ride as near as practicable to the r ight -hand edge of the roadway." Id. at § 41-6-8 )\ 'one of 
these exec; nons suggests, however , that the requi rement to ride with traffic on the r ight-hand 
side of the street is ever suspended or m a y be excepted. Subsect ion (3) states that "[i]f a useable 
path for bicycles has been provided adjacent to a roadway, bicycle i it i ::TS shall i ise tl ic pi it.I. i; u ic 1 
not the roadway/' Id, at § 41-6-87(3). However, as noted previously, when this provision is read 
in harmony with the other provisions and in light of the legislature's intent to promote bicycle 
safety, it still does not suggest tl lat bic> clists i i lav ride against traffic, • ::wen in. a bicycle lane. 
Subsection (3) directs that when a bicycle lane exists, a bicyclist need not ride as near to the edge 
of the roadway; the bicyclist must still ride with traffic, though. Plaintiff Hansen does not satisfy 
any of the statutoi y exceptions; and foi the reasons discussed prev ioi isly none of the exceptions 
5
 Subsection (H) indicates that a bicyclist may ride outside of the bicycle lane to make a 
left turn. This provision is in harmony with Utah Code section § 41-6-87( l)(b), though, and 
therefore is not at issue despite any indications from Plaintiff to the contrary. Indeed, this 
subsection of the ordinance js not at issue because Plaintiffs' admit in their brief that ^Hansen 
was not involved in a left turn at the time of the collision" (Brief of Appellant at 16.) Even so, 
subsection (H) does not indicate that any rules other than the requirement to travel in the bicycle 
lane are excepted in order to turn left. The exception does not permit violating other rules-
riding against traffic or on the sidewalk, for example-just because the bicyclist is making a left 
turn. To read the exception as broadly as Plaintiffs' suggest such that it permits the plaintiffs' 
actions would be contrary to the statutory language, intent, and purpose. It does not permit one 
to leave the bicycle lane mid-block, cross over to the left-hand side of the street, and then 
proceed against the flow of traffic for the remaining half block before turning left. 
13 
permits a bicyclist to ride against traffic. Any municipal ordinance purporting to except 
bicyclists from the requirement to ride with traffic is contrary to the language, intent, and 
purpose of the statute. 
In this case, the ordinance permits an activity that is prohibited by the statute. Plaintiffs' 
argument that Salt Lake City Ordinance 12.80.070(1) is a legal exception to the general statutory 
rule that bicyclists must ride on the right-hand side of the road with the flow of traffic is 
misplaced. Plaintiffs's assertion that the ordinance is an exception to the statute because "where 
two [statutes treat the same subject matter and one of them is general and the other specific, then 
the specific provision controls," is inapplicable to this case. (Brief of Appellant at 21.) Because 
this case does not deal with conflicting statutes, but with an ordmance in conflict with a statute, 
the authority cited by Plaintiffs in support of their assertion is inapposite: Taghipour v. Jerez, 
2002 UT 74, 52 P.3d 1252, involves competing state statutes, subsections 48-2b-125(2)(b) and 
48-2b-127(2) of the Utah Revised Limited Liability Company Act. as opposed to a statute in 
conflict with a municipal ordinance; J.J.W. v. State, 2001 UT App 271, 33 P.3d 59, involves 
competing state statues, the Juvenile Expungement Statute and the Administrative Challenge 
Statute, not a statute and a conflicting municipal ordinance; Gilger v. Hernandez, 2000 UT 23, 
997 P.2d 305, involves competing statutory provisions of the Utah Dramshop Act, not a conflict 
between a municipal ordinance and a statutory provision; Jerz v. Salt Lake County, 822 P.2d 770 
(Utah 1991), also involves a conflict between two state statutes, the Limitation of Landowner 
Liability-Public Recreation Act and its amendments and the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, 
as opposed to a conflict between a state statute and a municipal ordinance; and Murray City v. 
Hall, 663 P.2d 1314 (Utah 1983), involves a conflict between statutes. Utah Code sections 41-6-
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44.2 and section 41-6-44 opted verbatii n b; ' Mi u i ay Gt; ' ; u i< i not a coi iflict betwe ::i i 
a statute and a municipal ordinance. This case does not involve competing statutes as Plaintiffs 
seemingly profess. This case involves a state statute and a conflicting municipal ordinance. Salt 
Lake City Ordinance 12.80.070(1) puipnn , |. p iiini i bicu listi." ink HI (IK Ich h.nid nhul 
the street, against traffic, as long as he or she is within a marked bicycle lane. The state statute, 
on the other hand, prohibits bicyclists from riding against traffic, even when a bicycle lane is 
presen *• ,:H:— -!\ l • • •• • l • • *' .-i; 'oiv ^ n , d. 
Because the district court held just this in denying Plaintiffs1 motion for partial summary 
judgmen t , its decision should be affirmed. I he trial cour t ' s decision reads, in relevant part: 
The court finds that state law was and is (and probably always has been) 
clear that bicycles are to ride in the direction of motor vehicle traffic. . . . The 
court reads [the law] to mean that b icycles are still to ride with traffic, and if there 
is a bicycle lane, the bicycles should use the lane rather than the roadway. 
Subsect ion (3) of 41-6-87 does not g ive license to travel against traffic even in a 
bicycle lane. 
A n ordinance that purports to allow otherwise is in conflict with such state law. 
[I]t is directly against the Utah statute to travel by bicycle against the 
flow of vehicle traffic. Noth ing in state law gives any indication that travel by 
bicycles against vehicle traffic is approved. 
Plaintiffs argue that [t]he trial court decl ined to rule that Salt Lake City Ordinance 12.80.070(1) 
was invalid." (Brief of Appellant at 19; see also id. at 7, 15, 25.) This misconstrues the district 
cour t ' s decision. Plaintiffs' a rgument and a ci irsoi v reading of the ciistrict coi irf s decisioi i coi iJixl 
lead one to believe that the district court never held that the ordinance and statute were in 
conflict. However , a careful examinat ion reveals that this is simply not the case. The district 
court held that the state legislation prohibi ted bicycling against tl i.e flow of traffic. The district 
court also held that any ordinance that purpor ts to allow otherwise is in conflict with state law. 
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In denying the Plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment, the district court necessarily 
held that the ordinance conflicted with the statute. 
Plaintiffs make much of the district court's comments that it was "without any facts (as 
pointed out by Plaintifffs] to find that such an ordinance is not within the reasonable police 
powers," that it was "not mling on that aspect as it [was] without sufficient facts," and that "[t]he 
SLC ordinance thus appears to not be within reasonable police powers to attempt to allow such 
dangerous conduct." (Minute Entry (R. at 164)); (Brief of Appellants at 15-17, 19-23.) 
However, the court also clearly stated that u[t]hose comments [relating to the police powers 
issue], however, are not governing this case." The controlling factor for the district court was 
that "more importantly, it is directly against the Utah statute to travel by bicycle against the flow 
of traffic." (Minute Entry (R. at 164).) Thus, the district court correctly interpreted Utah Code 
section 41-6-87. Further, the district court also correctly determined that "any ordinance that 
purports to allow otherwise is in conflict with such state law." (Minute Entry (R. at 164).) 
Consequently, by mling that "Plaintiffs'] motion for partial summary judgment is thus denied," 
(Minute Entry (R. at 164)), the district court necessarily held that Salt Lake City Ordinance 
10.80.070 was invalid because it conflicted with the state statute. 
In sum. the district court correctly held that Utah statutory law requires bicyclists to ride 
with the flow of traffic, and that any ordinance that purports to allow otherwise is in conflict with 
such state law. Because Salt Lake City ordinance 12.80.070(1) purports to allow bicyclists to 
ride against traffic, it is invalid. The decision of the district court denying Plaintiffs' motion for 
partial summary judgment necessarily held that Salt Lake City Ordinance 10.80.070 was invalid 
and should be affirmed. 
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: units III ana i \ in Appellants"'' Brief f ail Because they were . 
i. > ui Assuming they were Preserved, they Still Fail on their Merits 
Points III and IV in Appellants' Brief Fail Because they were Not Preserved for 
Appeal 
Utah ; ippellate coi 1.1 ts "have loi i,g 1 1 laintained that to preserve an issue 0:1 1 appeal a p< 11 ty 
must first raise the issue before the trial court." Bair v. Axiom Design. LLC, 2001 UT 20, 1[ 30, 
20 P.3d 388 (citing State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656, 660-61 (Utah 1985)); see also e.g., Brookside 
Mobile Home Park. Ltd. v. Peebles, 2002 I 1 Y 48 1' I Ik 48 P.3d 968 (< -xplainii \\ i; the preserv; itic >n 
requirement); Hart v. Salt Lake County Comm'n, 945 P.2d 125, 129-30 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) 
(same). Neither argument was raised before the district court. Plaintiffs ex post facto argument 
in Point III was never raised in the district court and was therefore not preserved for appeal. 
Likewise, plaintiffs argument in Point IV, that acts done in conformance with an existing law 
cannot be negligent, was never raised in t!ie district court and was therefore not preserved either. 
Plaintiffs heading for Point III asserts that judicial invalidation of the ordinance should 
not permit a conclusion that Hansen acted negligently. Plaintiffs then proceed to argue that 
Plaintiff relied 1 :•* ! <; * -rke down 1!ie city ordinance "would 
make punishable as a crime, conduct that was presumptively lawful under the extant City 
Ordinance" and 'Violate rights guaranteed . . . by Article I, Section 9 of the Constitution of the 
United States and Article I, St • ' : ^ of :h. 1 , n^: • =. - - v ^t-it,- ofiVii* • ie ex 
post facto laws." (Brief of Appellant at 9-10, 23-25.) This argument was never raised before the 
district court, tlioiigl1 I he pleadings submitted by Plaintiffs in conjunction with the motion and 
cross-motion for summary judgment do not contain this argument, nor do they even suggest this 
argument. Neither Plaintiffs' "Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment," 
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(which was submitted with Plaintiffs1 initial motion for summary judgment and also incorporated 
into Plaintiffs' renewed motion) and its corresponding reply brief; nor Plaintiffs" "Response to 
Cross Motion of Defendant, The Nature Conservancy, for Partial Summary Judgment and 
Memorandum in Support of Renewed Motion for Partial Summary Judgment" and its 
corresponding reply brief mention this argument. Consequently, this argument may not be 
considered on appeal. 
Point IV of Plaintiffs' brief insists that "actions done in conformance with an existing law 
are not negligent." (Brief of Appellant at 25-27.) According to Plaintiffs, if one complies with 
city ordinances and does not commit a criminal violation, one cannot be negligent. This 
argument was also never raised before the district court, but is made for the first time on appeal. 
Nowhere in the pleadings submitted by Plaintiffs in conjunction with the motion and cross-
motion for summary judgment is this argument made or suggested. Consequently, this court is 
precluded from considering this argument on appeal. 
B. Even Assuming Points III and IV in Appellants' Brief were Preserved for 
Appeal, they Still Fail on their Merits. 
Plaintiffs' ex post facto argument is misplaced. The ex post facto authority relied upon 
by Plaintiffs is inapplicable to this case. "The protection against ex post facto laws applies only 
to criminal punishment, not civil remedies." In re Ennenga, 2001 UT 111. If 18, 37 P.3d 1150; 
see also State v. Daniels, 2002 UT 2, f 42-46, 40 P.3d 611 (explaining what constitutes an ex post 
facto law). This case is a civil action. Hansen is not being subjected to criminal punishment. 
Plaintiffs' argument in Point IV, that acts which comply with city criminal ordinances 
cannot be negligent, is simply erroneous. Plaintiffs cite authority defining lawful conduct, but 
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they do not cite any authority for the proposition that if one acts lawfully and does not violate a 
criminal statute, one cannot be negligent. Plaintiffs do not cite any authority because such 
authority does not exist. Simply because one does not commit a crime does not, a fortiori, mean 
that one is not negligent. Violation of a criminal safety statute is prima facie negligence in Utah. 
See, e.iz.. Child v. Gonda, 972 P.2d 425, 432 (Utah 1998), Intermountain Farmers Ass?n v. 
Fitzgerald, 574 P.2d 1162, 1164-65 (Utah 1978), Thompson v. Ford Motor Co.. 16 Utah 2d 30, 
33-34, 395 P.2d 62, 64 (1964). It is not axiomatic that "[t]he converse is also true:' (Brief of 
Appellant at 26.) It simply does not follow that compliance with criminal statutes and 
ordinances precludes a finding of negligence. 
CONCLUSION 
The district court correctly denied Plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment. 
State legislation, particularly Utah Code section 41-6-87, requires bicyclists to ride with, not 
against, traffic even when the bicyclist is in a marked bicycle lane. Salt Lake City Ordinance 
12.80.070(1) purports to allow bicyclists to ride against traffic when in a marked bicycle lane. 
Because the ordinance conflicts with the state legislation, the ordinance is invalid. Accordingly, 
the district court correctly determined that state legislation prohibited bicycling against the flow 
of traffic and that any ordinance purporting to allow otherwise, Salt Lake City Ordinance 
12.80.070(1) here, is in conflict with state law. As a result, the decision of the district court 
should be affirmed. 
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DATED this day of _ 2002. 
STRONG & HANNI 
,0 
Robert L. Janicki 
Michael K. Woolley 
Attorneys for Defendant / Appellee 
The Nature Conservancy 
7) 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the \v) day of (}(Kjft£Of' October 2002, two (2) 
true and correct copies of the foregoing document were mailed via U.S. mail postage prepaid to 
the following: 
Edward T. Wells 
Mel S. Martin 
MEL S. MARTIN P.C. 
5282 South Commerce Drive, #D-292 
Murray, Utah 84107 
Lloyd R. Jones 
PETERSEN & HANSEN 
230 South 500 East, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
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ADDENDUM 
Minute Entry of the District Court 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-16 (1998 Replacement Vol.) 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-17 (1998 Replacement Vol.) 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-87 (1998 Replacement Vol.) 
Salt Lake City Ordinance 12.80.070 
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IN THE DISTRICT C0RT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND Oi(^S^£f: LAKE COUNTY, MURRAY DEPARTMENT, 
'^fsft&'gg OF UTAH 
/; TYLER HANSEN a/id WORKERS ' 
COMPENSATION
 (/FUND, 
P l a i n t i f f s , 
vs. 




Case No. 010203125 
Honorable BRUCE C. LUBECK 
Court Clerk: Linda Vance 
June 5, 2002 
The above matter came before the court on June 5, 2002, on 
plaintiff's Motion for partial summary judgment and defendants' 
cross motions for partial summary judgment. Plaintiff was present 
with counsel Edward T. Wells, defendant Eyre was present through 
counsel Lloyd R. Jones, and defendant Nature Conservancy was 
present through counsel Robert Janicki. 
In this case plaintiff sought partial summary judgment in a 
motion filed September 2 6, 2001. The court granted defendant 
Eyre's Rule 56(f) motion for a continuance. Defendant Nature 
Conservancy was later added as a defendant and on March 28, 2002, 
filed a cross motion for partial summary judgment. Defendant 
Eyre joined in that motion. Plaintiff then renewed his motion 
for partial summary judgment. Each party responded and the 
moving parties each replied. 
BACKGROUND FACTS 
The following facts do not appear to be in dispute. 
This case involves an automobile-bicycle accident at 
approximately 200 South and 500 East in Salt Lake City. 
Plaintiff was traveling east-bound on 200 South, and at the time 
of the accident on the north side of the street, against motor 
vehicle traffic, within a marked bicycle lane. The lane is 
adjacent to vehicle travel lanes and on the north of the bicycle 
lane there is parking spaces for vehicles. He was just west of 
500 East, intending to turn north onto 500 East when he was hit 
by the vehicle driven by defendant Eyre as she was turning west 
onto 200 South after coming from the north, thus being south-
bound until she began her turn and the bicycle and Eyre's vehicle 
collided. Plaintiff was injured and sues Eyre and added her 
employer Nature Conservancy. 
ANALYSIS 
The standards for granting summary judgment are well known 
and will not be repeated. Plaintiff asserts that as a matter of 
law the court should grant his motion and declare that under a 
Salt Lake City Ordinance he had the right to be traveling in the 
bicycle lane as he was and he was thus not negligent for doing 
so. Defendants assert contrariwise that the SLC Ordinance is in 
conflict with State law and thus plaintiff was indeed negligent 
for traveling as he was in the eastbound bicycle lane against 
vehicular traffic. Defendants thus claim the court should grant 
their motion and find plaintiff was negligent. 
Various statutes and ordinances come into play. At the time 
of the incident in February, 2000, Utah Code Ann. 41-6-87 
required bicycles to travel 
(1) . . .as near as practicable to the right-hand edge 
of the roadway except when: 
(b) preparing to make a left turn at an 
intersection . . . 
(3) If a usable path for bicycles has been provided 
adjacent to the roadway, bicycle riders shall use 
the path and not the roadway. 
U.C.A. 41-6-17 (1) (h) provides that local authorities, "with 
respect to highways under their jurisdiction and within the 
reasonable exercise of police power," may "regulate the operation 
of bicycles . . ." • 
Plaintiff argues he was allowed to travel as he was by an 
ordinance, SLC Ordinance, 12.80.070(1) which provided: 
It is unlawful for operators of bicycles: 
(H) When riding upon a roadway marked 
with a bicycle lane to ride upon the 
sidewalk or any portion of the roadway 
outside the marked bicycle lane except 
when making a left turn; 
(I) To ride upon the left-hand side of 
any street, except when they are within 
a marked bicycle lane . . . 
Plaintiff thus argues that the court should declare that the 
ordinance allows plaintiff to ride in a marked bicycle lane, even 
if it is on the left side of the road and going against vehicle 
traffic. 
Utah law is clear that a local ordinance may be enacted that 
covers subjects already covered by state legislation but only if 
state law does not foreclose local legislation and "the ordinance 
in no way conflicts with existing state law." 
The court finds that state law was and is (and probably 
always has been) clear that bicycles are to ride in the direction 
of motor vehicle traffic. U.C.A. 41-6-87(3) is not to the 
contrary. The court reads that statute to mean that bicycles are 
still to ride with traffic, and if there is a bicycle lane, the 
bicycles should use the lane rather than the roadway. Subsection 
(3) of 41-6-87 does not give license to travel against traffic 
even in a bicycle lane. 
An ordinance that purports to allow otherwise is in conflict 
with such state law. Further, any ordinance which is to regulate 
bicycle traffic is to be within reasonable police powers under 
41-6-17. To allow bicycle riders to ride against traffic, even in 
a marked bicycle lane, appears to invite the very sort of 
incident that is the subject of this lawsuit. However, the court 
is without any facts (as pointed out by plaintiff) to find that 
such an ordinance is not within the reasonable police powers. 
However, from a common sense standpoint it is well known that the 
tendency of most motorists, any law to the contrary 
notwithstanding, when they are turning right onto a perpendicular 
street, is to look to their left for oncoming traffic, but not to 
look to their right. Thus, an ordinance that allows such bicycle 
traffic as plaintiff argues may or may not be within the police 
powers of the City. The court is not ruling on that aspect as it 
is without sufficient facts. Again, however, the ordinance 
appears to create problems with bicyclists in the same narrow 
lane going in two different directions. It invites dangers to 
motorists turning into oncoming bicycle traffic. The SLC 
ordinance thus appears to not be within reasonable police powers 
to attempt to allow such dangerous conduct. Those comments, 
however, are not governing in this case. 
However, more importantly, it is directly against the Utah 
statute to travel by bicycle against the flow of vehicle traffic. 
Nothing in state law gives any indication that travel by bicycles 
against vehicle traffic is approved. 
Plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment is thus 
denied. Defendants' cross motions for partial summary judgment 
is, however, also denied. Even if the plaintiff was not 
justified by ordinance in riding in the bicycle lane against 
vehicle traffic, that does not mean defendant is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law. The riding conduct is certainly a 
factor a trier of fact can consider in determining negligence. 
The jury instructions will have to be properly tailored that 
plaintiff was not justified by ordinance nor state law in 
traveling in the direction he was against traffic. That will be 
one factor in their evaluation of negligence and comparative 
negligence. The parties can marshal whatever evidence they have 
as to the safety (or lack thereof) of such conduct. 
Neither party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
DATED this *7 day of June, 2002. 
BY T^/COURT 
DISTRICT .COURT, JDDG; 
Case No: 010203125 
Date: Jun 05, 2002 
CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the 
following people for case 010203125 by the method and on the date 
specified. 
METHOD NAME 
Mail ROBERT L JANICKI 
ATTORNEY 
#9 Exchange Place 
Suite 600 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Mail LLOYD R JONES 
ATTORNEY 
230 SOUTH 500 EAST 
SUITE 400 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84102 
Mail EDWARD T. WELLS 
ATTY 
5282 SOUTH COMMERCE DRIVE 
#D-292 
MURRAY UT 84107 
Dated this ^ day of £. 
3fep£ty Court C le rk 
tf / w 
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TRAFFIC RULES AND REGULATIONS 41-6-17 
41-6-16. Uniform application of chapter — Effect of local 
ordinances. 
The provisions of this chapter are applicable and uniform throughout this 
state and in all of its political subdivisions and municipalities. A local authority 
may not enact or enforce any rule or ordinance in conflict with the provisions 
of this chapter. Local authorities may, however, adopt ordinances consistent 
with this chapter, and additional traffic ordinances which are not in conflict 
with this chapter. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 7; C. 1943, Cross-References. — Powers and duties of 
57-7-84; L. 1987, ch. 138, § 9. all cities, traffic regulations, § 10-8-30. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Cited in Hornsby v. Corporation of Presiding 
Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day 
Saints, 758 P.2d 929 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 7A Am. Jur. 2d Automobiles statutes or ordinances forbidding automotive 
and Highway Traffic § 19. "cruising" — practice of driving repeatedly 
C.J.S, — 60 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 43. through loop of public roads through city, 87 
A.L.R. — Validity, construction, and effect of A.L.R.4th 1110. 
41-6-17. Regulatory powers of local authorities — Traffic-
control device affecting state highway — Neces-
sity of erecting traffic-control devices. 
(1) The provisions of this chapter do not prevent local authorities, with 
respect to highways under their jurisdiction and within the reasonable 
exercise of police power, from: 
(a) regulating or prohibiting stopping, standing, or parking; 
(b) regulating traffic by means of peace officers or official traffic-control 
devices; 
(c) regulating or prohibiting processions or assemblages on the high-
ways; 
(d) designating particular highways or roadways for use by traffic 
moving in one direction under Section 41-6-60; 
(e) establishing speed limits for vehicles in public parks, which super-
sede Section 41-6-48 regarding speed limits; 
(f) designating any highway as a through highway or designating any 
intersection or junction of roadways as a stop or yield intersection or 
junction; 
(g) restricting the use of highways under Section 72-7-408; 
(h) regulating the operation of bicycles and requiring the registration 
and inspection of them, including requiring a registration fee; 
(i) regulating or prohibiting the turning of vehicles or specified types of 
vehicles; 
(j) altering or establishing speed limits under Section 41-6-48; 
385 
41-6-17 MOTOR VEHICLES 
(k) requiring written accident reports under Section 4 l~ti IJ 
(1) designating no-passing zones under Section 41-6-59, 
(m) prohibiting or regulating the use of controlled-access roadways by 
any class or kind of traffic under Section 41-6-65; 
(n) prohibiting or regulating the use of heavily traveled streets by any 
class or kind of traffic found to be incompatible with the normal and safe 
movement of traffic; 
(o) establishing minimum speed limits under Subsection 41-6-49(3); 
(p) designating and regulating traffic on play streets; 
(q) prohibiting pedestrians from crossing a highway in a business 
district or any designated highway except in a crosswalk under Section 
41-6-77; 
(r) restricting pedestrian crossings a I unmarked crosswalks undei 
Section 41-6-82.10; 
(s) regulating persons propelling push carts, 
(t) regulating persons upon skates, coasters, sleds, skateboard^ and 
other toy vehicles; 
(u) adopting and enforcing temporary oi experimental ordinances as 
necessary to cover emergencies or special conditions; 
(v) prohibiting drivers of ambulances from exceeding maximum speed 
limits; 
(w) adopting other traffic ordinances as specifically authorized by this 
chapter. 
(2) A local authority may not erect or maintain any official traffic-control 
device at any location which requires the traffic on any state highway to stop 
before entering or crossing any intersecting highway unless approval in 
writing has first been obtained from the Department of Transportation 
(3) An ordinance enacted under Subsection (l)(d), (e), (f), (g), (i), (j), (1), (m), 
(n), (p), or (r) is not effective until official traffic-control devices giving notice of 
the local traffic ordinances are erected upon or at the entrances to the highway 
or part of it affected as is appropriate. 
History: C. 1953, 41-6-17, enacted by L. and traffic-control devices, and enacted present 
1979, ch. 242, § 2; 1983, ch. 337, § 1; 1987, § 41-6-17 
ch. 138, § 10; 1998, ch. 270, § 14. Amendment Notes, — The 1998 amend-
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws ment, effective March 21, 1998, substituted 
1979, ch 242, § 2 repealed former § 41-6-17, "Section 72-7-408" for "Section 27-12-145* in 
as last amended by L 1961, ch 86, § 1, relating Subsection (Dig) 
to the regulatory powers of local authorities, 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Evidentiary rules 
Parking of vehicles 
Evidentiary rules. 
City had no express or implied power, under 
Subsection (l)(a), to make presence of illegally 
parked vehicle prima facie evidence that owner 
committed or authorized the violation Nasfell 
v. Ogden City, 122 Utah 344, 249 P2d 50/ 
(1952) 
Parking of vehicles. 
A city has no power to pass an ordinance 
declaring owners of vehicles prima facie re-
sponsible for illegal parking of such vehicles 
Nasfell v Ogden City, 122 Utah 344, 249 P2d 
507 (1952) 
TRAFFIC RULES AND REGULATIONS 41-6-87 
(2) This section does not prohibit attaching a trailer or semitrailer to a 
bicycle or moped if that trailer or semitrailer has been designed for attach-
ment. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 73; C. 1943, 
57-7-150; L. 1978, ch. 33, § 29; 1987, ch. 138, 
§ 91. 
41-6-87. Operation of bicycle or moped on and use of 
roadway — Duties, prohibitions. 
(1) A person operating a bicycle or a moped upon a roadway at less than the 
normal speed of trafBc at the time and place and under the conditions then 
existing shall ride as near as practicable to the right-hand edge of the roadway 
except when: 
(a) overtaking and passing another bicycle or vehicle proceeding in the 
same direction; 
(b) preparing to make a left turn at an intersection or into a private 
road or driveway; or 
(c) reasonably necessary to avoid conditions including, but not limited 
to, fixed or moving objects, parked or moving vehicles, bicycles, pedestri-
ans, animals, surface hazards, or substandard width lanes that make it 
unsafe to continue along the right-hand edge. In this subsection, "substan-
dard width lane" means a lane that is too narrow for a bicycle and a vehicle 
to travel safely side by side within the lane. 
(2) Persons riding bicycles or mopeds upon a roadway may not ride more 
than two abreast except on paths or parts of roadways set aside for the 
exclusive use of bicycles. Persons riding two abreast may not impede the 
normal and reasonable movement of traffic and on a laned roadway shall ride 
within a single lane. 
(3) If a usable path for bicycles has been provided adjacent to a roadway, 
bicycle riders shall use the path and not the roadway. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 74; C. 1943, 
57-7-151; L. 1949, ch. 65, § 1; 1978, ch. 33, 
§ 30; 1987, ch. 138, § 92; 1989, ch. 44, § 1. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 7A Am. Jur. 2d Automobiles A.L.R. — Sufficiency of evidence to raise last 
and Highway Traffic § 249. clear chance doctrine m cases of automobile 
C.J.S. — 60A C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 396(1) collision with pedestrian or bicyclist — modern 
et seq. cases, 9 A.L R.5th 826. 
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12.80.070 Riding rules and regulations-Unlawfiil acts 
It is unlawful for operators of bicycles: 
A. When riding upon a sidewalk to fail to yield the right-of-way to pedestrians and sound a 
warning device before overtaking or passing any pedestrian; 
B. To ride more than two abreast upon any street; 
C. To proceed othei ftitn single \\\v upon any sidewalk; 
D. To carry extra passengers or carry any packages, bundles or articles which woi ilcl require 
the removal of the hand or hands from the handlebars of the bicycle; 
E. To permit the bicycle MJ« li opurdlui i , in ling lt> be lowed by another vehicle or bicycle; 
F. To ride any bicycle upon any sidewalk within the central traffic district, as defined in Section 
12.04.090 of this title, or its successor, and as described in Schedule 1 of this title, set out 
in Chapter 12.104, or its successor, and made a part hereof by reference, or on any other 
area where prohibited by signs, provided, however, the foregoing shall not apply to police 
officers in the scope and course of their employment; 
G. To carry more persons at a time than the number for which the bicycle is designed to carry 
on seats firmly attached thereto; 
H. When riding upon a roadway marked with a bicycle lane to ride upon the sidewalk or any 
portion of the roadway outside the marked bicycle lane except when making a left turn; 
I. To ride upon the left-hand side of any street, except when they are within a marked bicycle 
lane or when riding upon a one-way street. (Ord. 16-89 § 1, 1989; prior code Title 46, Art. 
18 §278) 
